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Abstract 
We consider cross-border migration through the lens of the capabilities 
approach, with special reference to transnational migration and to implications 
for the approach itself. Cross-border migration has profound and diverse 
effects, not least because it accelerates change in the nature of political 
community. A capabilities approach can be helpful through its insistence on 
multi-dimensional, inter-personally disaggregated, reflective evaluation. At the 
same time, the realities of migration exercise pressure on capabilities thinking, 
to deepen its underlying social and political theory and nuance its efforts to 
counter communitarian tendencies. By extending its attention to migrants and 
the locality-spanning social and political spaces in which they live, the 
capabilities approach will be able to better concretize and situate the picture of 
the ‘we’ who ‘have (or seek) reason to value’ purported goods and rights. 
Keywords 
International migration, transnationalism, capabilities approach, identity, 
human security 
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MOVEMENTS OF THE ‘WE’1 
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL 
MIGRATION AND THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 
1 Introduction 
Mobility has always been a major feature of human life. Article 13 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights further asserts the right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of each state and the right to leave 
any country, including one’s own, and to return. However, the capabilities 
approach, that seeks to provide a well reasoned formulation and basis for 
human rights (Nussbaum 2006; UNDP 2000), has yet to address cross-border 
migration with sufficient self-reflexivity. We will explore both how the 
approach can assist in considering current realities of migration, and the 
implications that thinking about cross-border migration has in turn for the 
capabilities approach. 
Ability to access public services in one’s locality and to participate in 
society depends on capability for movement. In the terms of Sen’s version of 
capability theory, ‘we have reason to value’ the capability of sufficient local 
mobility. The meanings here of ‘one’s locality’ and of ‘we’ are typically taken as 
self-evident. Migration, by contrast, concerns movement between localities; 
and cross-border migration concerns movement also between polities. Circular 
migration and transnational networks bring ongoing intense connections 
between people in different polities. Transnational migration refers to cross-
border movements that involve retention of this intense contact with the 
locality of departure, through remittances or visits, frequent communication, 
intended or actual return or continuing cultural reference, or some 
combination of these. Such connections undermine the binary constructs of 
national-international and local-global that structure dominant discourses on 
migration. Work on transnational migration widens our understanding, from 
for example a stress on just one relationship of belonging – the citizen in 
relation to the nation-state seen as a unified identity community – to 
appreciation of multiple relations stretching across family and kinship systems, 
communities and nation-states. But state practices for the constitution of 
political communities often apply polarizing approaches, ‘nationalist’ rather 
than ‘transnationalist’ (Earnest, 2006). In addition to discussing how far people 
have reason to value the capability of inter-national mobility, analysts must 
reflect on who are the ‘we’ that capability theory’s formulations may take as 
relatively self-evident. International migration, and within it especially 
transnational migration, can bring confusion, modification and extension of 
the meanings of ‘we’. There is need to reconsider assumptions in normative 
political theory that remain tacit in most development studies. 
This essay first briefly presents the enrichment of perspective that 
capabilities thinking’s multi-dimensional and inter-personally disaggregated 
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approach can give for looking at migration’s diversity of impacts (for a more 
detailed treatment see de Haas 2009a). It goes further by looking at impacts on 
identities and by asking how evaluators could be oriented and motivated to use 
such an enriched but more demanding perspective, suggesting that it can help 
to counter imbalances in capital-centred and nation-centred treatments of 
cross-border migration. In doing so it identifies though a core ambiguity in 
capabilities analysis, around the specification of the ‘we’. So finally it examines 
how human development theory can itself be deepened through thinking about 
cross-border migration, with special reference to migration’s impacts on 
perceptions of affiliation and identity and to assumptions about and influences 
upon political community.  
2   A capabilities perspective for looking at the impacts of  
migration 
A capabilities approach to migration responds to the implications of Swiss 
novelist Max Frisch’s famous description of the ‘guest-worker’ policy during 
Western Europe’s postwar economic boom: ‘We had called for labour power, 
and there come human beings’ (‘Man hat Arbeitskräfte gerufen, und es 
kommen Menschen’; cited by Scheffer, p.224). Migration must be studied and 
evaluated as action by and on people, not only as economic flows seen as a sort 
of impersonal mechanics. The capabilities approach includes use in evaluation 
of a much wider range of criteria than traditional economic concerns with 
measurable impacts on economic output and remittances – in other words, it 
uses a broader picture of well-being; and second, a potentially richer picture of 
human agency in explanation and interpretation, with attention to the 
formation or suppression of capabilities to think and act, and the formation 
and evolution of preferences and of feelings of identity and affiliation. The 
broader ranges of concern in evaluation and in explanation are connected; 
human observers can both grasp and often share the values that human agents 
form and follow. 
In this broader perspective, amongst the fundamental impacts of 
migration systems are exposure to new worlds of experience and the creation 
of new identities and groups, besides sometimes profound changes in 
distribution of income, status and opportunities between groups and between 
genders. New social spaces are created too, including frequently a nether world 
of illegality and exploitation which severely limits and distorts the freedoms 
and capacities of many migrants. 
Diverse valued impacts, varying across persons and groups 
Capabilities analysis looks at impacts on individuals’ real freedoms to attain 
what they (or an evaluator group, perhaps a public authority) have reason to 
value, not merely at money flows to the aggregate entities of the nation or the 
household. The range of relevant values partly mirrors the range of reasons for 
migration besides economic gain or physical security. Such reasons include 
religious and political motivations, and searches for sexual or cultural freedom 
or adventure. Sharma (2008)’s study of the migration of young men from the 
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hills of Nepal to the megalopolis of Mumbai shows how it is perceived as an 
important phase of growing as a man. Even if remunerative work were 
available in the hills, some young men would still seek the challenge of a period 
in a distant place that offers less social constraints, allows wider experiences, 
experimentation and personal growth, and is recognized as a phase in 
becoming ‘a man’. 
Migration differently affects numerous relevant groups and individuals. 
Many aspects of this are well known—for example how remittances typically 
increase differentiation of social position between families in the sender 
country; how refugees and other migrants often lose their original status as 
they settle in a new country, not least for men who may lose some male 
prerogatives; and how migrant workers in the ‘heart trade’ physically and 
emotionally care for the aged, the infirm and the children of affluent societies 
often at substantial cost to themselves and their own dependents who are left 
behind (Ehrenreich & Hochschild 2003, Parrenas, 2001). Nonetheless, the 
capabilities approach’s insistence on disaggregation to the level of the 
individual, and on systematic accounting there in terms not merely of money 
or of ‘interests’ but also in terms of health, time, affiliation, respect, identity, 
and other major values, can often generate new insights. While a disaggregated 
broad-value-spectrum treatment is not unique to capabilities theory, the 
approach provides a formal framework that can consolidate and sustain such 
treatment. 
Let us illustrate with reference to two types of impact that have been less 
emphasised in previous reviews of migration and human development (de 
Haas, 2008, 2009a): the frequent creation of a world of illegality which has 
major implications for capabilities; and, especially, the impacts on identities, for 
those have implications for the capabilities approach itself. 
Illegality and its socio-political implications 
While being central to processes of socio-economic development (de Haas, 
2009), immigration is treated legally as requiring special permission. Behind the 
presentday official parade of firm legal restriction, low-cost immigrant labour 
remains readily available through ‘irregular’ means, with sending states locked 
into a path of labour exports as a means to cope with fiscal deficits and 
unemployment, and receiving states maneuvering between the pressures of 
labour needs, xenophobic sentiment, humanitarian concerns and global 
competition. Entire industries emerge that rely on labour that lacks rights, 
security or permanence, and thus typically is unorganised, docile and – cheap 
(Samers, 2004, Lucas, 2005, Oishi, 2005). Ironically its ‘irregularity’ increases 
the demand, for labour that is not entitled to publicly set minimum wages, legal 
protections and social provisions becomes attractively cheap. Many migrant 
workers in this nether world are vulnerable to capabilities damage. 
Various recent studies (e.g. Kuptsch, 2006) show the diversity of actors 
involved in today’s migration processes and their complex linkages with state 
institutions. The role of private recruitment agents and networks has grown 
(Tierney, 2007). Implementation of legal norms of preference for high-skilled 
labour entrants leaves a demand for private agents engaged with the lower-skill 
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range who operate quasi-legally or illegally. The inability and low priority by 
governments to control these agents and their networks has allowed the rise of 
a category of ‘irregular migration’, a term that reflects an ambiguous 
relationship between migrant and state. Such a relationship often denies 
migrants protection and weakens their bargaining power and employment 
conditions. When faced with exploitative practices such as the demand for 
supplementary contracts once abroad in addition to the fees originally agreed 
for brokerage services, migrants lose earnings, incur more debts, and can be 
entrapped in a semi-permanent state of ‘transition’. They have to seek higher-
wage jobs and thereby become more vulnerable to smuggling and trafficking 
(Kojima, 2007).  
The costs of this induced zone of ambivalence, permissive of diverse 
forms of exploitation, demand to be evaluated from a human-centred 
perspective. Footloose global capital has prised open and undermines social 
protection systems, traditional or modern, in many countries. Footloose 
migrants restore some protection to their kin and communities through great 
efforts and stress, in legal and illegal intra- and inter-national migration. Such 
migration to and fro puts social ties and identities under stress, and seems to 
prevent the kind of consciousness required for effective resistance to 
exploitation (Faist, 2004). The longer run impacts of creating such zones of 
illegality could yet be major, as were those of liquor Prohibition in the USA.  
Besides considering distribution of benefits and costs between groups and 
persons, we must consider impacts on the very identity of persons and 
constitution of groups. 
Impacts on values and identity; the creation of new groups 
Of central importance for this essay’s concerns, migration creates new 
identities, for all concerned, not only for those who move. Firstly, migration in 
space is typically an existential migration too, which involves also the people 
the spatial migrants leave behind. It is likely to influence values in both 
countries, through flows of ‘social remittances’ (Levitt, 1998) in both directions 
(see e.g. Suksomboon, 2008). Emigrants themselves typically experience major 
feelings of loss, and often pass through a phase of introversion, nostalgia, and 
avoidance of other groups. At group level this is typically followed—in the 
classic model of interwar Chicago sociologist Robert Park—by phases of 
greater contact, competition and conflict, and eventually of greater 
accommodation and substantial assimilation. 
Secondly, groups are formed who are different from those previously 
found in either the country of origin or the country of arrival. This clearly 
happens in cases of long-term settlement. It can happen too even as a result of 
temporary movements. For example, even those movements produce children 
who possess identities different from any which preceded migration. Nuqui 
(2008) looks at the migration of Filipina brides and Filipina women 
‘entertainers’ to Japan. ‘Entertainers’ as a category have a long-term role, but 
not so the individual women. They are typically trafficked under false pretences 
and then forced into prostitution for some years until no longer profitable. The 
movement of brides is no doubt intended as permanent, but each year about 
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4,000 of these marriages end in divorce. In both cases there are some 
permanent effects. Nuqui reports that over 150,000 Filipino-Japanese children 
have been born. They are mostly now back in the Philippines, and very many 
of them are not at home in either country. Similar experiences are documented 
for Korea and Taiwan. 
Thirdly, as important as the creation of new groups in a country is the 
impact on previously existing identities there. In-migration often leads to 
existential migration for the previous residents too, as we see now in much of 
Western Europe. Current estimates suggest that by the mid 21st century post-
war immigrants (excluding those from Western Europe and North America) 
and their descendants could be a quarter of the Netherlands population. 
Within the next decade they will already comprise half the population of a city 
like The Hague. Reactions are diverse, from welcoming the enriching of 
identity, to seeking to revive an imagined prior culture, to attempts to 
selectively and constructively guide cultural evolution, as will be discussed later.  
The next section situates this capabilities perspective centred on 
individuals in relation to predominant perspectives centred on the nation or 
the market value of production. It identifies both its attractions and a core 
ambiguity or choice between its cosmopolitan and communitarian strands or 
potentials. 
3   Capabilities theory in comparison to capital-centred 
and nation-centred frameworks for understanding and 
evaluating international migration 
Gore (1996, 2000) compares approaches to international development in terms 
of alternatives in two dimensions: use of a national or a global frame in 
explanation; and of a national or a global frame in valuation. For example, a 
particular sort of global frame in explanation gained predominance in the 
1980s: the perspective of global market economics. National economies were 
deemed to prosper or not according to their degree of exposure to 
international market forces; greater exposure was held to spread ideas and 
competition and promote economically efficient specialization and division of 
labour; and vice versa. This explanatory model was partnered by a particular 
approach to valuation: everything must be valued in terms of ‘world prices’, the 
prices in the global market. But that stance in valuation differed fundamentally 
from an ethic of human inclusion. People with no purchasing power are not 
counted in the global market, and people of wealth are counted many-fold. 
A capabilities approach has something to contribute to both explanatory 
and evaluative thinking about international migration. In principle it provides 
some counterweight to one presently dominant framework, that of capital-
centred calculation; and it could potentially also counterbalance a second, that 
of nationalism and the nation-state, which is partly in conflict with the first but 
is usually its partner. This potential second contribution may require 
elaboration of cosmopolitan humanist strands within capabilities theory, 
without losing all of its communitarian strands. Let us consider how the 
‘broad-value-spectrum, high-person-resolution’ approach of capabilities theory 
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contrasts with the frameworks of nation-state calculation and capital-centred 
calculation and their dominant alliance. The frameworks are ideal-types, and 
combinations and other types are also possible. 
The Westphalian perspective: no global normative framework 
and typically no global explanatory framework 
In a Westphalian perspective, the world consists of states, distinct and separate 
universes of political legitimacy and—since over time most of these states have 
fallen into the mould of the nation-state—of cultural identity (Booth, 2007). 
The very term ‘state’ exhibits a persistent ambiguity: it refers to, first, an 
apparatus of governance that has somehow absorbed and become inseparable 
from, second, the society that it governs. States interact with each other, in this 
perspective, for the defence and advancement each of their own corporate self-
interest, unilaterally interpreted. They are deemed normative universes, each 
with its own determining sovereign power. Between states there is no 
determining sovereign power and no inherent moral obligations apply, no 
norms other than—perhaps—those born out of mutual convenience and 
agreement, though those are liable to be flouted when no longer of 
convenience to one party. Under restrictive migration policy, potential 
migrants may have a right to emigrate but they have no right to immigrate, to 
another people’s national home. They will be kept out unless their entry 
furthers the national interest. The perspective assumes that States have the 
power as well as the right to exclude immigrants. Besides normative 
nationalism it includes in various ways a methodological or explanatory 
nationalism (Gore, 1996, 2000; Wimmer & Schiller, 2003): an assumption that 
countries can and do in key respects separate themselves from others and are 
therefore the relevant units in description, explanation and regulation. 
Categorical boundaries are drawn to distinguish between: ‘political 
refugees’, who may, at least in principle, be granted entry as exemplification of 
the political principles which the state endorses; ‘economic refugees’, whose 
claims for a right to asylum are denied, but who may if very fortunate be 
admitted under the next category; legal migrant workers, those invited in for 
furtherance of the national (economic) interest, on either temporary or 
indefinite terms, who are typically correspondingly subdivided into unskilled 
and skilled categories; and illegal migrant workers, who are at risk of 
deportation. Lastly, persons who have been trafficked under false pretences or 
coercion are officially protected by international law, but are often treated as 
illegal migrants and have their human rights ignored from all sides (GAATW, 
2007). 
The categorical boundaries have been outmoded by processes of 
globalization—we can often not distinguish for example between ‘economic’ 
and ‘political’ refugees when political conflict or globally determined economic 
policies bring destruction of means of livelihood of some groups in poor 
countries—but they remain in force; for they reflect a normative nationalism 
and one way of seeking to cope with global pressures. While industry and 
finance, and the impacts of their actions and fluctuations, have long since gone 
global, justice remains operational primarily within the confines of the nation-
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state (Caron, 2007). Explanatory nationalism bolsters this normative 
nationalism: rich countries which energetically export arms to troubled poor 
countries whose manufactured and agricultural exports they at the same time 
firmly restrict through use of tariff and non-tariff barriers, while also drawing 
away their best educated personnel, yet hold the poor countries 
overwhelmingly responsible for their failed systems of governance and thereby 
draw no conclusions of moral obligation for themselves – obligations to help 
constructively, to cease destructive exports, to open economic opportunities, 
and to admit more deserving migrants (cf., e.g., Black, 1996, for a similar 
diagnosis). No causal connection is drawn between the systems of global 
economic and political governance, controlled by the rich countries, and the 
flows of aspirant migrants out of the poorer countries. 
The capital-centred perspective: a global explanatory frame 
and a non-humanist global normative frame 
Capital-centred approaches evaluate migration with reference to contributions 
to profitability and economic growth. Post World War Two economic growth 
has generated both pull- and push- forces for huge migration flows. Not least, 
the physical displacement of an estimated 15 million people per annum by new 
development projects, and the interconnected impacts in many countries of 
economic structural adjustment, environmental change and armed conflict (see 
e.g. CHS, 2003), strengthen the impulse to migrate. 
Pure capital-centred approaches extol free migration, using theories of the 
comprehensive virtues of systems of free markets. They combine a global 
explanatory perspective—including a theory of the interconnections of 
markets worldwide—with a particular sort of normative perspective with a 
global scope. Market principles do not distinguish between buyers or sellers on 
the basis of any non-economic criteria of nationality or race, gender or creed. 
They distinguish only on the basis of money power: those with the most 
purchasing power have the loudest voice, and those with no purchasing power 
have no voice at all. They are free to starve (see, e.g., Davis 2001). This 
normative perspective has global scope but little humane content. 
Extreme market-based ethics assert that whatever eventuates from 
voluntary market processes must be seen as a fair outcome, and as providing a 
fair starting point for subsequent activity. In practice, a capital-centred 
approach is mostly combined with a nationalistic application of a ‘veil of 
ignorance’ to the historical record of dispossession, domination and 
discrimination globally (Bagchi 2008; Gasper 2005; Scheffer 2007). As a result, 
the distress entry of some migrants into exploitative networks of the sex trade, 
the ‘heart trade’ and what is now called the new slave trade become seen as 
Pareto improvements that fortunately alleviate regrettable but fair starting 
positions. 
Immigration policy within states that are the main global centres of capital 
is largely directed by this synthesis of capital-centred and nation-centred 
perspectives. Capital migrates legally across the political boundaries, as a 
supposedly fundamental expression of and condition for freedom, but the 
movement of low-skilled labour is, at least on paper, rigorously controlled. 
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This global set up is strictly analogous to the South African system of apartheid 
before 1994, argues Mine (2010) amongst others. 
Market demands for low-cost labour for agriculture, construction, sexual 
services, care and many other types of service ensure that much formally illegal 
immigration does occur. As we saw, the illegality renders the labour 
exceptionally low-cost and benefits employers and consumers in high-income 
areas, but can in the end leave many migrants poorly remunerated, insecure 
and at risk of legal victimization and super-exploitation by intermediaries. 
Using a textbook model of perfectly (or sufficiently or ‘workably’) rational and 
well informed agents, the capital-centred approach declares that migrants only 
move because it improves their well-being.  All is for the best. As with the 
trade in human organs, neoclassical economics in purist versions declares that 
the sex trade and the heart trade must be considered beneficial since they are 
entered into by willing sellers who know their own needs and preferences 
better than does anyone else. The argument assumes that choosers are capable, 
well-informed and not coerced; and that the starting point for negotiation is 
just. Some others will consider a life separated from one’s children, due to 
absence of opportunities to fulfill social expectations and requirements at 
home, as unjust, even when entered into voluntarily and in full awareness of 
the implications, which is certainly not always the case. Often the promises 
made in advance concerning ability to save and remit funds are far from the 
truth that awaits the emigrants.  
Fortunately, liberal societies which have bound themselves to international 
protocols and have strong independent legal systems do not treat migrants as 
mere labour power, for also in play are principles of human rights (Scheffer, 
2007). Two variants of thinking that reflect such principles – especially so in 
the second case, the human security approach – are discussed below. 
The capabilities perspective: a humanist global value 
perspective, in terms of individuals’ real freedoms 
A capabilities perspective that understands people as finite and vulnerable, 
creatures of hope and fallibility, benevolence and malevolence too, helps us to 
interpret a world in which not all is for the best (e.g., Nussbaum, 1999, 2001, 
2007; Gasper & Truong, 2010). As an approach to human development it pays 
attention to fundamental features of being human. For many people ‘well-
dying’, for example, is central to well-being, extending perhaps to a wish to be 
buried in the land of origin, in the company of one’s closest familiars. Many 
Ghanaian migrants to the Netherlands yearn for a reverse migration after 
death, and pool resources so as to fulfill that wish of their departed fellows. 
While an extreme example, this wish to have a meaningful and honourable 
death is perhaps especially strong amongst migrants. 
As discussed earlier, a capabilities approach refers thus to a wide range of 
relevant values beyond those captured in standard economic measures. As part 
of this it insists on reference to objective well-being, i.e. societally (and 
sometimes globally) approved criteria of fundamentally important capabilities 
and functionings, not only to subjective well-being, states of mind. It is 
important to consider how long people live and how healthily, for example, 
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not only whether or not they are cheerful. We cannot automatically assume 
that Nepalese young men who depart to face the challenges of India’s cities 
and who survive there for some years in and out of marginal jobs are 
necessarily discontented; but assessment of mental states, while essential, does 
not substitute for assessment of objective circumstances. Cheerful migrants are 
not necessarily contented overall; and insofar as they are happy one must still 
ask how far this is despite their circumstances, not thanks to them. 
A capabilities approach refers then to real freedoms to achieve things that 
people have reason to value. The stress on freedoms reflects that this is a 
political conception, about judgements by a relevant community of which 
things it should respect and promote, rather than in most cases oblige or 
enforce. The ‘we’ in the phrase ‘capabilities that we have reason to value’ 
concerns a political community (directly, or as represented by politicians 
and/or administrators). These capability judgements are not those of an 
individual choosing for him or herself. This feature is sometimes missed (e.g., 
in the introductions by Alkire 2005, Robeyns 2005) since the capabilities 
approach is concerned so much with real freedoms of the individual in a given 
life-environment.  
In issues of personal and community identity, capability theorists including 
Sen (2006) have stressed that, although choice is always encultured choice, yet 
there is always and should always be some choice of culture. Individuals can 
choose between or differently weight the various elements of identity and 
heritage which are open to them. But here the individuals are choosing identity, 
not capabilities. The decisions to facilitate individuals to have (in Nussbaum’s 
terms) the internal capabilities and combined capabilities required for this 
autonomous choice, and over which areas of life, are community decisions 
(Gasper, 2007). 
A potential tension within capabilities thinking arises, between its habitat 
in informing the deliberations of a political community, and its underlying 
motivation. For why should we engage in ‘broad-value-spectrum, high-person-
resolution’ evaluation? The reasons, in terms of recognition of and respect for 
human dignity, the dignity of each individual, have cosmopolitan scope. And 
what should be done if the deliberations of a political community lead to the 
oppression of a minority, even to its majority-supported eviction or 
extermination? The capability approach to human development must rest on a 
conception of human rights more extensive than purely national, more for 
example than the right to vote in a referendum that decides on revocation of 
one’s rights, even one’s extermination. To return to cross-border migrants and 
Max Frisch, immigrants are to be seen as human beings, not as alien abstract 
labour-power. 
Human security: a global explanatory frame added to a global 
normative frame 
This paper has sketched so far three ideal types in migration discourse: first, a 
nationalist perspective that adopts only the nation as its ethical space, and 
typically adopts a national frame in explanation too; second, a capitalist 
perspective that adopts a global frame in both evaluation and explanation, but 
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with enormous exclusions in concern for poor people; and, third, a capabilities 
perspective that has a global normative frame, in two senses—a 
comprehensive interest in the contents of people’s lives, and a concern for 
people everywhere, grounded in perceptions of human dignity and 
fundamental rights. Mahbub ul Haq combined such a normative perspective 
with a global-wide scope in explanation too, in his Human Development 
Reports of the early 1990s and in particular in his conception of human 
security, launched in the 1994 Report. We use that to represent a fourth ideal-
type that thereby goes somewhat beyond the third. The conception has been 
taken further by Amartya Sen and others, not least in the report of the 
Commission on Human Security (CHS, 2003). 
A human security framework is particularly relevant to the theme of 
migration. It enriches the project of international human rights, as an 
attempted corrective to the dominant project of global capitalism. The 
framework goes beyond the Westphalian conception of states and citizenship 
and recognises instead a transnational, interpenetrated system. It combines this 
‘joined-up thinking’ in explanation—a tracing through of fundamental 
interlinkages that cross national borders and conventional disciplinary 
boundaries—with cosmopolitan ‘joined-up feeling’ in valuation, giving priority 
to basic needs everywhere. The human security approach can at the same time 
be less individualistic than baldly stated human rights thinking, allowing more 
emphasis on community and security of identity. It thus combines the political 
projects of human development and human rights with major elements of care 
ethics and sensitivity to subjectivities (Burgess, 2007; Gasper and Truong, 
2005, 2010; Gasper, 2010).  
Complementing the human rights principle of respect for basic 
requirements of human dignity, another normative principle of global scope 
informs human security thinking. The choice of a global frame in explanation 
reflects the realities of global interconnection, which carry an ethical 
implication that is underlined in the 2007-8 Human Development Report on 
climate change. The meaning of the ‘we’ in policy discussion—at least one of 
the major ‘we’s—must be: everyone whom the actions under discussion 
substantially affect. Often this ‘we’ extends worldwide.  
Ethical reflection and policy stances on migration centre in large degree 
around how to specify the ‘we’. Let us look further at how migration affects 
and is affected by such conceptions; and at the agenda for investigation and 
discussion that arises. 
4   Who are the ‘we’ who experience, react, reason, move, 
and co-exist ? 
The ‘we’ in capabilities theory and political philosophy 
The mainstream of political philosophy, like the social sciences as a whole 
(Wallerstein et al., 1996), have tended to take nation-states as givens, and to 
treat people’s mobility as an exception rather than as a general feature of 
humankind. In Rawls’s theory of (domestic) justice, the parent theory against 
 15
which both Sen and Nussbaum define themselves, migrants are not 
considered. In other words the theory excludes a basic issue in human 
existence. Migrants did not fit readily into Rawls’s social contract conception. 
His ‘original position’ could still be, but was not, conceived in terms of the set 
of all humans, with individuals not knowing which nation they will belong to 
nor whether they will be faced by pressures that induce them to emigrate. His 
later conception of political liberalism (Rawls, 1993) includes the freedom to 
choose where to live and where to work, but only for citizens and within 
national boundaries. At global level such freedom is at present restricted to 
global elites (Düvell, 2003). Rawls’s theory of international justice proceeds 
instead in terms of a fiction of supposedly self-sufficient, roughly equal, and 
internally emotionally united ‘peoples’ (Rawls, 2000), rather than dealing, as 
does his domestic theory, with individuals and their claims to basic rights. 
Nussbaum (2006) shows how his social contract formulation marginalises the 
weak, nationally and especially internationally, and she presents instead a 
theory of basic rights/capabilities. She has not yet applied this to international 
migration. Such application would be of great interest, and might be enriched 
from other work on the rights of migrants, such as by Benhabib (2004) or 
Black (1996). 
While capabilities thinking reacts in part against Rawls, it has grown out of 
the same parent tradition of Western political philosophy which took the city 
state as its framework and later the nation state, as well as out of a parent 
tradition of welfare economics where little attention was paid to political, let 
alone international, framework. Sen has recognised how personal identity, the 
‘I’, is inherently plural (e.g., in Sen, 2006). People thus have choices, whether or 
not they recognise them, of how to weight their diverse inherited and acquired 
values and identity features, including even an option to apply zero weight to 
some features. His discussion of reasoned choice by individuals and in groups 
does not say much about how to constitute, maintain or modify a notion and 
practice of ‘we’. Yet international migration, especially transnational migration 
creates new liminal zones, zones of experience around a transition or 
boundary, where identity categories are unstable, ambiguous and plural.  
Since it deals at the level of individuals, a capabilities ethic helps us to 
some degree to cope with the reality that migration reconfigures the national 
‘societies’, the supposedly separate boxes that are assumed by nationalist ethics. 
However, it has to face further complexities, that are perhaps less attended to 
in ‘migration systems theory’ (Mabogunje, 1970; de Haas, 2008, 2009b) or most 
discussions of the ethics of migration (e.g., Black, 1996): not only the societies 
are reconfigured, so are the individuals. Migration brings cultures into closer 
contact and collision, and thus modifies individuals too and creates new social 
worlds: social locations that have never existed before and new combinations 
of identities.  
Migration presents thus a particularly intense case of the endogeneity of 
values. The capabilities ethic arose to deal with such a challenge, that of 
‘adaptive preferences’, by directing attention to how people live and can live, 
not just to how well or ill they feel. But its way of resolution involves reasoned 
debate and decision-making by a political community to identify and prioritise 
aspects of people’s living. Choices around migration concern options in which 
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the political community itself is configured differently by different options, and 
where members may have affiliations to multiple communities.  
From its political philosophy background, capabilities theory has 
addressed what the community, in the sense of the city or nation, should 
evaluate favourably and thus guarantee or support for all its members. 
Nussbaum extends capabilities thinking to a global stage, but she does so as an 
ethical cosmopolitan not a political cosmopolitan: thus still within a strong 
nation-state framework but with an ethic of human rights and mutual 
sympathy that generates attention to obligations (and to benevolence beyond 
duty) across borders (Nussbaum, 2006).  
Some argue that international mobility is a right, as an implication of 
human unity. Some argue that it can never be more than a conditional 
privilege, since the fundamental unity is that of the political community 
organised as a state. Black, for example, is led “to question whether the 
individual-level focus normally associated with discussions of ‘human rights’ is 
apt in migration settings” (Black, 1996, p.73). Some of the first group assert the 
hypocrisy of nations that were largely formed by immigration enforced against 
the wishes of the original inhabitants that then rigorously control subsequent 
immigration. However, if their argument is that the wishes of existing 
inhabitants should be decisive this leads away from a principle of open 
borders.  
Rather than abandoning an individual-level focus in discussion of human 
rights and migration, one can de-absolutise it, as Nussbaum in effect does. 
First, one should clarify rights to what. Black helpfully highlights the frequent 
relevance and sufficiency of a status of ‘denizen’ rather than full citizen: 
migrants who acquire rights of residence together with other civil rights but 
without becoming full members of the political community. Second, even if 
mobility is a right, the principle will like other rights not be without limit and 
override all else. In the same way, a right—other things being equal—of the 
rich consumer to ride and fly endlessly does not (i.e., should not) override the 
rights of contemporaries and future generations to more basic goods, notably a 
stable global climate. The impact on those other, more important, rights is too 
major to allow priority to unlimited mobility. Likewise any right of migration 
would have to be balanced against considerations of other rights and 
considerations of prudence, and in light of other action alternatives. The 
absorptive capacity, including psychological capacity, of receiver countries has 
limits in any given period, and many potential migrants would gain equally or 
more through measures in their home country (cf. Black, 1996). Amongst 
other rights against which the claim to mobility must be balanced is not only 
the right ‘of communities to exclude those who constitute a threat to the 
community’ (Black, p.73) but also to stop inflows on such a scale as to 
jeopardise public order and acceptance of institutions of social justice (pp. 71-
72). Migration scholars must discuss such policy matters with sensitivity to the 
range of likely effects and to the ways that societies realistically can evolve and 
over what time scales.  
To recap, one possible response to the endogeneity of values is to take the 
declared universality of human rights as providing principles of choice that are 
not themselves endogenous. But simply to declare rights does not suffice to 
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have them agreed and honoured. Nussbaum’s attention to affiliation and 
imagination is helpful here in thinking about the necessary ongoing 
construction of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983). Every political 
community beyond a village is an imagined community, most of whose 
members will never know each other. It must be continually re-imagined for it 
to serve its unifying functions, as conditions evolve and as the players change. 
In the late modern world, this construction of identity can appropriately be 
influenced by the perspective of interconnectedness that is particularly strong 
in human security thinking. That perspective can favour ‘joined-up feeling’, if it 
conduces to a perception of ‘we’ as being all those who fundamentally affect 
each other: a recognition of humanity as a ‘community of fate’. 
The ongoing construction and maintenance of real and 
imagined communities 
International migration, and perhaps especially transnationalism, may 
contribute to ‘The global spread of plural loyalties [which] is essential to the 
creation of a new world order: it is the psychic infrastructure without which 
the emergence of such an order remains impossible’ (Goulet 2006: 127). The 
contribution is possible rather than inevitable. Transnationalism—the retention 
of intense ongoing linkages to the country of origin—complicates, though it 
also potentially enriches, national citizenship. It may potentially facilitate global 
citizenship, but certainly not automatically (Gasper 2005). Further, the global 
spread is likely to be only gradual and long term. For Goulet refers here not to 
the cosmopolitanism of the market, where the same rules are enforced globally 
but there may be loyalty to very little and where the weak are not counted; he 
refers instead to a solidaristic cosmopolitanism of mutual openness, goodwill 
and support. The associated rethinking of the contents of ‘self’ cannot be 
rushed. It may require first a phase of respectful coexistence motivated by a 
rethinking of the implications of ‘self-interest’ in an interconnected world 
where one interacts not with (post-)colonial subjects but with active agents 
who command respect and treatment according to equal principles. 
Mushakoji (2010) and other writers warn that global solidarity should not 
be seen as fundamentally opposed to local solidarity. If the principle of 
concern for others is not locally fostered and applied it will not be present to 
be applied globally. And nothing will be achieved simply by advising either the 
newer or the longer established residents in any city in The Netherlands that 
they are all now world citizens, remarks Scheffer (2007); instead it is essential 
to revive local community loyalty and involvement. Facing the existential 
dilemmas emerging from many states’ attempts to strengthen their citizenry’s 
national identity and at the same time, given the forces of economic and 
demographic change, to accommodate many immigrants within a framework 
of citizenship, Mushakoji argues for a synthesis of national values and universal 
liberal values. Otherwise universal values will remain exogenous and always 
liable to criticism as an imposition of cultural colonialism. Mushakoji (2010) 
uses a form of human security discourse, to promote acceptance of, first, 
plurality of identities; second, perception that one’s identity can be enriched 
rather than threatened by the identities of others, a perception that can be 
promoted by the phase of respectful co-existence and mutual learning 
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mentioned above; and thus third, plurality in each person’s identity, including 
elements of shared human identity. 
Mushakoji writes mainly of Japan. Scheffer (2007) sifts the contemporary 
debate in the Netherlands, a country well-used to rule others and to export 
population, which is now undergoing fundamental transformations and self-
examination as a result of immigration from outside Europe that began in the 
1950s but has brought an explosion of concern fifty years later. He starts with 
Park’s classic model of phases of absorption of immigrants in the USA. Ghetto 
formation initially is a normal part of immigration, driven both by avoidance 
by the earlier city residents and by the newcomers’ needs for mutual support 
and affirmation; but it can tie too many immigrants into an insular and 
resentful milieu. Scheffer recounts a growing realisation in the Netherlands, 
however, that one could not continue demanding integration by immigrants 
into a society which lacked any clear idea of its principles and in which earlier 
residents themselves participated less and less. The society could only demand 
from newcomers an accordance to rules that were clear and applied equally to 
all. His analysis shows how a spatial migration by some is part of an existential 
migration by all. The analytic lenses of human capabilities and human security 
must be used to think about prior residents as well as about immigrants (cf. 
Burgess, 2007). Will the new members of the society be part of a renewed 
conception of citizenship – part of a rethought nation in a globalized world – 
or will they only be workers and consumers, bitplayers in the melodramas of 
global capitalism?  
The central question, argues Scheffer, is whether immigration is seen as 
the end of the possibility for a ‘we’, or as an occasion to reflect anew on the 
meaning of ‘we’ and to update it in a changing and learning world, as a part of 
moving forward which requires also a conscious looking back. He proposes 
that to maintain and build community loyalty we require the feeling of being 
part of something that has a history, which gives a heritage from which 
residents benefit regardless of where they were born, and that has a future; so 
that residents have towards it a debt and some obligations. Without a feeling of 
‘we’, which includes a perspective of some shared heritage, there will be 
insufficient acceptance of shared responsibility for the present and future. The 
recognised shared heritage must cover all the fundamental strands that have 
created the society, including for example slavery and colonialism and 
immigration.  
The issue of citizenship is not limited to the relation between recent 
immigrants and longer-settled residents, continues Scheffer, but involves also 
other relations over time. Response to problems of sustainability requires a 
similar recognition—now at global as well as local scales—of shared heritage, 
of a shared and interconnected present in which people must take 
responsibility for whatever damage they cause, and of a shared future. Insofar 
as migration encourages a necessary updating of conceptions of citizenship, it 
may contribute to preparation for the challenges of global sustainability. 
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5   Conclusion 
The paper has suggested that a capabilities approach can contribute usefully to 
thinking about international migration, and be deepened through this 
engagement. The insistence on disaggregation to the level of the individual, 
and on systematic accounting there in terms of a range of collectively reasoned 
values, provides additional insights. A ‘broad-value-spectrum, high-person-
resolution’ treatment may be grounded in other ways too, but the capabilities 
approach gives a theorized framework for evaluation and understanding that 
insists on such treatment. 
We discussed in particular the impacts of international migration on 
identity, for these have implications for the capabilities approach itself. 
Migration reconfigures not only societies, it reconfigures persons, and creates 
new categories and combinations of identities. Implicitly the capability 
approach’s category of ‘we’, the ‘we’ that ‘have reason to value’, is in 
movement too. Thinking through the ethical and policy implications of such 
movement is a central challenge in migration studies and for the capability 
approach. The paper has reviewed some promising lines of response, from 
work on citizenship and on human security. 
Even in less ambitious evaluative work, a capabilities approach provides 
an orientation rather than an elaborate theory or methodology, and is in no 
way self-sufficient. To theorise, describe and evaluate processes of migration in 
depth requires connection also to richer bases in social theory, including 
analyses of social embeddedness and of the formation of migration regimes in 
various localities, and systematised sets of indicators that relate to those 
theoretical bases. But we suggested the importance of a basic orientation that 
provides some counterweight to frameworks of capital-centred calculation and 
of nationalism and the nation-state. This involves elaboration of the 
cosmopolitan humanist strand within capabilities theory while not losing its 
communitarian sensitivities; we saw this in some of the current work on 
human security.  
 Amongst migration’s implications are the move towards greater 
complexity of identity, arguably a desirable trend, and the need for a new 
understanding of rights and entitlements appropriate to a transnationalised 
world of mobility. The capabilities approach can both contribute and be 
enriched through attention to those issues. 
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